Files

Package exec is the code interpreter: run a snippet in a sandbox and move files in and out.

files

GET /v1/files/{wildcard1}

List the files in an execution session

Lists what a session holds, addressed by session id — the uploads a run can read and the artifacts it produced, each then fetched from /v1/download. The listing's shape is the executor's own; this module names only that the address is keyed by session id.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

POST /v1/files/{wildcard1}

List the files in an execution session

Lists what a session holds, addressed by session id — the uploads a run can read and the artifacts it produced, each then fetched from /v1/download. The listing's shape is the executor's own; this module names only that the address is keyed by session id.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

PUT /v1/files/{wildcard1}

List the files in an execution session

Lists what a session holds, addressed by session id — the uploads a run can read and the artifacts it produced, each then fetched from /v1/download. The listing's shape is the executor's own; this module names only that the address is keyed by session id.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

PATCH /v1/files/{wildcard1}

List the files in an execution session

Lists what a session holds, addressed by session id — the uploads a run can read and the artifacts it produced, each then fetched from /v1/download. The listing's shape is the executor's own; this module names only that the address is keyed by session id.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

DELETE /v1/files/{wildcard1}

List the files in an execution session

Lists what a session holds, addressed by session id — the uploads a run can read and the artifacts it produced, each then fetched from /v1/download. The listing's shape is the executor's own; this module names only that the address is keyed by session id.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

OPTIONS /v1/files/{wildcard1}

List the files in an execution session

Lists what a session holds, addressed by session id — the uploads a run can read and the artifacts it produced, each then fetched from /v1/download. The listing's shape is the executor's own; this module names only that the address is keyed by session id.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

GET /v1/files

The session file surface

The root of the executor's session-file surface. The contract addresses a session's files one segment down (/v1/files/{session_id}); this bare address is served because one registration owns the whole prefix, and what it answers is the executor's to decide.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

POST /v1/files

The session file surface

The root of the executor's session-file surface. The contract addresses a session's files one segment down (/v1/files/{session_id}); this bare address is served because one registration owns the whole prefix, and what it answers is the executor's to decide.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

PUT /v1/files

The session file surface

The root of the executor's session-file surface. The contract addresses a session's files one segment down (/v1/files/{session_id}); this bare address is served because one registration owns the whole prefix, and what it answers is the executor's to decide.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

PATCH /v1/files

The session file surface

The root of the executor's session-file surface. The contract addresses a session's files one segment down (/v1/files/{session_id}); this bare address is served because one registration owns the whole prefix, and what it answers is the executor's to decide.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

DELETE /v1/files

The session file surface

The root of the executor's session-file surface. The contract addresses a session's files one segment down (/v1/files/{session_id}); this bare address is served because one registration owns the whole prefix, and what it answers is the executor's to decide.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

OPTIONS /v1/files

The session file surface

The root of the executor's session-file surface. The contract addresses a session's files one segment down (/v1/files/{session_id}); this bare address is served because one registration owns the whole prefix, and what it answers is the executor's to decide.

NOTHING RUNS HERE. cloud forwards the request to the sandboxed executor byte for byte and forwards its answer back the same way — the status, the Content-Type and every field are the executor's, including fields this repo has never named and including its own 4xx. There is no os/exec anywhere in this process: the sandbox is the isolation boundary, and cloud adds only the credential check and the single public address.

AUTH is a shared SERVICE key on X-API-Key, compared in constant time — not a user JWT. The chat server calls this server-side on a user's behalf, so this surface carries no org scope and no per-user identity; separation between callers is the executor's session, not this edge's. A wrong key is 401, and a deployment with no key configured is 503 rather than open.

One registration owns this address for every method, so which methods actually answer is the executor's decision, not this edge's.

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